31 verbatim requirements from Guidelines for Motion to Determine Evidence of Medical Treatment or Service Expenses ("768-0427 Motion").
Fourth Judicial Circuit (Duval, Clay, Nassau). Procedural information only; not legal advice.
Verbatim from https://www.jud4.org/getContentAsset/19cf9b22-d364-4152-ab15-01ce5f724d80/135b97c9-84fa-4e82-b956-0fbccec4aa1f/Guidelines_for_768-0427_Motions.pdf?language=en, harvested 2026-07-25; whitespace normalised only. • When counsel for the parties agree or concede during the hearing that the 768.0427 Motion requires an evidentiary hearing including fact and expert testimony, for the Court to make findings of fact, the existence of additional case specific legal arguments not referenced in the ,Motion or Response (or the failure to file a Response altogether), the failure to adequately prepare for the hearing or otherwise fully inform the Court, or secure appellate counsel to argue the 768.0427 Motion, the hearing must be continued and rescheduled- delaying resolution of the motion for weeks or months, depending on the amount of hearing time needed to present all relevant fact and expert witness testimony, proffered evidence, and comprehensive legal arguments for the Court to consider in making its ruling, whether limited pre-hearing discovery relevant to the Motion will be necessary, and whether a Daubert or any other evidentiary Motions(s) will be necessary to determine the admissibility of any testimony or evidence in support of or opposition to the 768.0427 Motion. • In any event, at a minimum, counsel for the parties must consider and discuss the following during the conferral process prior to filing 768.0427 Motion and scheduling 768.0427 Motion hearings: • Can section 768.0427(2) be construed as the "evidentiary" component because it provides that evidence of medical expenses "is admissible as provided in this subsection," that evidence of past, paid expenses "is limited to evidence of the amount actually paid," and that evidence of unpaid or future medical expenses "shall include, but is not limited to, evidence" of the share of expenses borne by the plaintifPs health care provider (section 768.0427(2)(a)-(c), Fla. • Does the use of "is admissible" and "shall include, but is not limited to" combined with catchall clauses allowing "[a]ny evidence" of reasonable expenses indicate that subsections (2Xb) and (2)(c) provide a non-exhaustive list of admissible evidence of unpaid past and future medical expenses while allowing for other evidence of reasonable expenses -together with the phrase "is admissible" and the title *Admissible Evidence of Medical Treatment or Service Expenses" - frame the statute as an evidentiary rule of inclusion not exclusion? Can these provisions of this statute be placed in the same types of statutes using the word "shall" to signifu that a court must admit such evidence when it is proffered, produced, or presented by a party (e.9. $772.15, Fla. • Stat. providing that a verdict or adjudication of not guilty "shall be admissible in evidence") - not to signiff that apafi must proffer, produce, or present such evidence. • If you interpret section 768.0427 as providing that juries must reduce medical expense damages based on collateral sources, then did section 768.0427 implicitly repeal section 768.76(1) by removing the requirement for the court to make post-verdict reductions - if so, is this construction permissible if the two statutes can be read consistently with each other (see Newell v. • If section 768.0427 is read as clariffing the evidence the Court must consider when reducing a damages award post-verdict, does this interpretation undermine the intent of the legislature when enacting the statute (see Fla. • Defendants propose that the language of section 768.0427-in particular' the use of the word ..shall"---creates mandatory methods for Plaintiff to admit past and future medical expenses and, thereby, limits the evidence Plaintiff may introduce at trial' (See Defendants' Proposed Order at Doc. 160.) Specifically, Defendants claim that the only permissible method for Plaintiff to admit 2 -- 8 of 21 -- past unpaid medical expenses is by way of subsection768.A427(z\(b)2,and that Plaintiff s tuture medical expenses must be admitted in accordance with subsection 768'a427(2\(c)1' see id' • Plaintiff opposes Defendants' interpretation of section 768.0427 by appeal to the statutory language immediately after the "shall" retied upon by Defendants . • (See Doc. 13 I .) Plaintiff asserts the statutory text -'shall include, but is not limited to, evidence as provided in this paragraph" in both subsections $763.0427(2Xb) and 5768.0427(2Xc) creates non-exhaustive lists of admissible evidence. 1d Moreover. • The palties have also not raised any constitutional issues or arguments. and the Court has not considered any constitutional concerns in denying the Motions.2 Further, the motions do not present any issues conceming post-trial setoffs under section 768.76, Fla' Stat. • Davis,339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022). "Judges must exhaust all the textual and structural clues that bear on the meaning of a disputed text." Conage v' Lrniled • To the extent they do not conflict, this Court is bound by both statutes. 4 -- 10 of 21 -- • It could have said that the enumerated categories of evidence are "required." It could have said that plaintiffs "must prove" the amount of medical expenses as provided in subsections (2Xb) and (2)(c), E g. g763.0755 ("lf a person slips and falls on a transitory fbreign substance in a business establishment, the injured person must prove that the business establishment had actual or constructive know-ledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it.") (emphasis added). • Instead, subsection (2Xb) states: ..Evidence offered to prove the amount necessary to satisfu unpaid charges for incurred medical rreatment or services shall include, but is nat timitedlo, evidence as provided in this paragraph'" * 765.0427(2Xb) (emphasis added)' • Instead, subsection (2xc) states: "Evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for any future medical ffeatment or services the claimant will receive shall include, but is not limited lo, evidence as provided in this paragraph'" $ 7 68.0427 (zXc) (emPhasis added). ..[W]hen the legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but not in another section of the same statute. the omitted language is presumed to have been excluded intentionally." USAA Cas. • Here, the legislature used different language-"is limited to" for paid medical expenses in subsection (2Xa) and ''shall include, but is not limited to" for unpaid past and 7 -- 13 of 21 -- future medical expenses in subsections (2Xb) and (2Xc). • Finally. even if subsections (2Xb) and (2Xc) did not use the phrase :'shall include' but is not limited to," the statute still would not limit evidence for unpaid past and future medical expenses. • Again. subsection (2) of the statute States: ..Evidence offered to pr0ve the amount of damages for past or future medical treatment or services in a personal injury or wrongful death action is admissible as provided in this subsection." $ 758'042 7(2),Fla' stat' (emphasis added)' It 10 -- 16 of 21 -- does not use the word "required" or otherwise state that a plaintiff must introduce the listed evidence. "If the Legislature had intended such a meaning, it could easily have made such intention clear." Oreu,s v. • For instance. the legislature did not write: "A party must prove the amount of damages for past or future medical treatment or services in a personal injury or wrongful death action as provided in this subsection." • The word "shall" in the phrase "shall include, but is not limited to" does not mean a plaintiff is required to introduce the listed categories of evidence. • Depending on the context in w'hich it is used, the word ..shall" can have either a permissive or a mandatory sense. • Dade county,27l So. 2d 11g, 121 (Fla. 1972) (applying "[a] permissive rather than mandatory construction,'to the word "shall" in a Florida statute). • There are many Florida Statutes that use the word ..shall" to merely authorize the admission of evidence. • Stat' (202s)(..Certification pursuant to ss. 403.9 401-403.9425 shall be admissible as evidence of public need and necessity in proceedings under chapter 73 or chapter 74."), see also 'd' $$ 672'724' • The United States Supreme Court has noted that "certain of the Federal Rules use the "\'ord .shall, to authorize" but not to require,judicial action." De Marlinez v. • Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that "the 1l -- 17 of 21 -- term'shall' can be construed as'must' or'may."' Allstate Ins. • Indeed,'ocourts in virtually every English-speaking jurisdiction have held-by necessity-thzr. shall means may in some contexts, and vice versa:" Bryan A. • The Florida Supreme Court has explained that the interpretation of the word "shall" ..depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.,, st.ft. v. • Here, there are two contextual reasons why the word o'shall" should be construed in its permissive, not mandatory sense. • This understanding further demonstrates that subsections (2Xb) and (2)(c) do not set forth lists of evidence that a plaintiff i s required to introduce or else suffer a directed verdict.
When counsel for the parties agree or concede during the hearing that the 768.0427 Motion requires an evidentiary hearing including fact and expert testimony, for the Court to make findings of fact, the existence of additional case specific legal arguments not referenced in the ,Motion or Response (or the failure to file a Response altogether), the failure to adequately prepare for the hearing or otherwise fully inform the Court, or secure appellate counsel to argue the 768.0427 Motion, the hearing must be continued and rescheduled- delaying resolution of the motion for weeks or months, depending on the amount of hearing time needed to present all relevant fact and expert witness testimony, proffered evidence, and comprehensive legal arguments for the Court to consider in making its ruling, whether limited pre-hearing discovery relevant to the Motion will be necessary, and whether a Daub
Reviewer note: Document sha256: 82dc9ca46f55aef0c3e898ba65d5c998e73bb0b7bfc20a9838ba1b5a050df605. Extracted from the document's own text layer.
Judge Bell caps motions and responses at 5 pages for UMC hearings and 12 pages for special-set hearings.
Judge Alijewicz requires every motion for attorney's fees and/or costs to attach a document detailing time records — no records, no fee award.
Judge Corlew bars informal contact: every communication with the Court must be in writing, filed with the Clerk, with copies furnished to all parties — and no calls to the JA to schedule or cancel UMC.