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40 verbatim requirements from Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence.
Fourth Judicial Circuit (Duval, Clay, Nassau). Procedural information only; not legal advice.
Verbatim from https://www.jud4.org/getContentAsset/491d0a61-a60b-4f8a-a250-e564e4bd3082/135b97c9-84fa-4e82-b956-0fbccec4aa1f/SciMan3D01.pdf?language=en, harvested 2026-07-25; whitespace normalised only. • The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Academies or the organizations that provided support for the project. • In this welter of modern science, ambitious scientists, self-designated experts, billion- dollar corporate entities, and aggressive claimants, judges must weigh evidence, judge, and decide. • Judgment is required even when using sophisticated statistical methods. • Judges, on the other hand, must rule on causation based on existing information. • Concepts of causation familiar to scientists (no matter what stripe) may not resonate with judges who are asked to rule on general causation (i.e., is a particular stimulus known to produce a particular reaction) or specific causation (i.e., did a particular stimulus cause a particular consequence in a spe- cific instance). • In the final analysis, a judge does not have the option of suspending judgment until more information is available, but must decide after considering the best available science. • Finally, given the enormous amount of evidence to be interpreted, expert scientists from different (or even the same) disciplines may not agree on which data are the most relevant, which are the most reliable, and what conclusions about causation are appropriate to be derived. • Even individuals with such prejudices may not appreciate that they have them, nor may they realize that their interpretations of scientific issues may be biased by them. • Judges and juries, however, must consider financial conflicts of interest when assessing scientific testimony. • The threshold for pursuing the possibility of bias must be low. • Judges must also be aware that the research methods of studies funded specifically for purposes of litigation could favor one of the parties. • Proper resolution of those disputes matters not just to the litigants, but also to the general public—those who live in our technologically complex society and whom the law must serve. • The upshot is that we must search for law that reflects an understanding of the relevant underlying science, not for law that frees companies to cause serious harm or forces them unnecessarily to abandon the thousands of artificial substances on which modern life depends. • The law must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically sound knowledge. • In our country, it must always seek to protect basic human liberties. • A number of innovative techniques have been developed to strengthen the ability of juries to consider difficult evidence.8 Any effort to bring better science into the courtroom must respect the jury’s constitutionally specified role—even if doing so means that, from a scientific perspective, an incorrect result is sometimes produced. • The judge, without interfering with the jury’s role as trier of fact, must determine whether purported scientific evidence is “reliable” and will “assist the trier of fact,” thereby keeping from juries testimony that, in Pauli’s sense, isn’t even good enough to be wrong. • In this age of science we must build legal foundations that are sound in sci- ence as well as in law. • First, it recognized the trial judge as the “gatekeeper” who must screen proffered expert testimony.6 Second, the objective of the screening is to ensure that expert testimony, in order to be admissible, must be “not only relevant, but reliable.”7 Although there was nothing particularly novel about the • To determine whether proffered scientific testimony or evidence satisfies the standard of evidentiary reliability,11 a judge must ascertain whether it is “ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science.”12 The Court, empha- sizing that “[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one,”13 then examined the characteristics of scientific methodology and set out a nonexclusive list of four factors that bear on whether a theory or technique has been derived by the scientific method.14 First and foremost, the Court viewed science as an empirical endeavor: “[W]hether [a theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested” is the “methodology [that] distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.”15 The Court also mentioned as indicators of good science whether the technique or theory has been subjected to peer review or publication, whether the existence of known or potential error rates has been determined, and whether standards exist for controlling the technique’s operation.16 In addition, although general acceptance of the methodology within the scientific community is no longer dispositive, it remains a factor to be considered.17 • Id. at 593–94. “[W]e do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.” Id. at 593. • Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the district court erred when it excluded a conclusion based on a scientifically reliable methodology because it thereby violated the Court’s precept in Daubert that the “focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodol- ogy, not on the conclusions that they generate.”28 The Supreme Court responded to this argument by stating that conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. • The opinion adopts a flexible approach that stresses the importance of iden- tifying “the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.”43 The court must then make sure that the proffered expert will observe the same standard of “intellectual rigor” in testifying as he or she would employ when dealing with similar matters outside the courtroom.44 • Part III of the opinion when the Court engages in a remarkably detailed analysis of the record that illustrates its comment in Joiner that an expert must account for “how and why” he or she reached the challenged opinion.45 • It fell outside the range where experts might rea- sonably differ, and where the jury must decide among the conflicting views of different experts, even though the evidence is shaky. • Although Kumho is the most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on how to determine whether proffered testimony by an expert is admissible, and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended in 2000 to provide “some general standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony,” it is still Daubert that trial courts cite and rely on most frequently when ruling on a motion to preclude expert testi- mony.47 Even though Daubert interprets a federal rule of evidence, and rules of evidence are designed to operate at trial, Daubert’s greatest impact has been pre- trial: • Since Daubert, moreover, parties relying on expert testimony have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet. . . . • Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 20 findings, which, when considered alone, may not individually prove the conten- tion.51 It appears that many of the most well-respected and prestigious scientific bodies (such as the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), the • In applying the scien- tific method, scientists do not review each scientific study individually for whether by itself it reliably supports the causal claim being advocated or opposed. • In Daubert, Justice Blackmun’s opinion explicitly acknowledges that in some cases admissible evidence may not suffice to support a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. • Judgment is required in determining which inferences are appropriate, but an approach that encourages looking at studies sequentially rather than holisti- cally has costs that must be considered. • As a threshold matter, the witness must be qualified as an expert to present expert opinion testimony. • For example, an expert who seeks to testify about the findings of epidemiological studies must be knowledgeable about the results of the studies and must take into account those studies that reach conclusions contrary to the position the expert seeks to advocate. • The field of toxicology, which, unlike epidemiology, is an experimental science, is rapidly evolving, and prior case law regarding such studies may not take into account important new developments. • What role should statistical significance play in assessing the value of a study? Epidemiological studies that are not conclusive but show some increased risk do not prove a lack of causation. • Even, however, if plaintiffs convince the trial judge that their experts relied on reliable and relevant evidence in establishing general causation, that is, in opin- ing that the defendant’s product can cause the adverse effects for which plaintiffs seek compensation, plaintiffs must also present admissible expert testimony that the defendant’s product caused their specific injuries. • If scientists seeking to testify for opposing sides disagree, some courts conclude that one side must be wrong.66 The possibility that both sides are offering valid scientific inferences is rarely recognized, even though this happens often in the world of science. • Another difficulty in proving causation in toxic tort cases is that plaintiff must establish that he or she was exposed to defendant’s product. • Mo. 2000), aff’d per curiam, 252 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff claimed that drug she had taken for lactation suppression had caused her stroke; trial court held that Daubert precluded experts from finding causation on the basis of case reports, animal studies, human dechallenge/rechallenge data, internal documents from defendant, and Food and Drug Administration’s revocation of drug for lactation suppression; appellate court stated: “We do not discount the possibility that stronger evidence of causation exists, or that, in the future, physicians will demonstrate to a degree of medical certainty that Parlodel can cause ICHs. • Did plaintiff manifest symptoms typical of AML that was chemically induced and not idiopathic? How could one calculate how much benzene plaintiff would have been exposed to considering how many hours he worked and how the gasoline was delivered? How much benzene exposure is required to support the conclu- sion that general causation has been established? Each of these issues is discussed in considerable detail, suggesting that the studies that would logically be needed to conclude that the alleged exposure can be linked to causation may simply not have been done.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Academies or the organizations that provided support for the project.
Reviewer note: Document sha256: 7f73734fd93fe69b7294fe8e48c0a06bec9ce46829db182ba35d98940abd387b. Extracted from the document's own text layer.
Judge Bell caps motions and responses at 5 pages for UMC hearings and 12 pages for special-set hearings.
Judge Alijewicz requires every motion for attorney's fees and/or costs to attach a document detailing time records — no records, no fee award.
Judge Corlew bars informal contact: every communication with the Court must be in writing, filed with the Clerk, with copies furnished to all parties — and no calls to the JA to schedule or cancel UMC.