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12 verbatim requirements extracted from judge-lillian-ewen__Standing-Order-on-Civil-Closing-Argument.pdf, across 1 topic.
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit (Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, St. Lucie). Check the order's own effective and rescission dates before relying on it. Procedural information only; not legal advice.
EXHIBITS & EVIDENCE • 1. Counsel is reminded that the purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues in a case by “applying the evidence to the law applicable to the case.” Mayo v. Gazarosian, 727 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1999); Airport Rent -A-Car, Inc. v. Lewis, 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Cohen v. Pollack, 674 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4- 3.4(e). Hill v. State , 515 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla. 1987). See also, McGee v. State, 83 So.3d 837 (Fla. 4 D 2011) (quoting, Fleurimond v. State, 10 So.3d 1140, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)) (“The purpose of closing argument is to present a review of the evidence and suggestions for drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence.”); Gonzalez v. State 990 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 2008) (“The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”). • 2. Counsel should be afforded great latitude in presenting closing argument, but they must “confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.” Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla.5 th DCA 1998); see also Venning v. Roe , 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In addition, counsel must not use closing argument to “inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response…rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.” Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). • 3. Counsel shall not comment upon irrelevant matters unrelated to the evidence presented at trial. The purpose of closing argument is disserved when comment upon irrelevant matters is permitted. See Hernandez v. State, 960 So.2d 816 (Fla. 3 DCA 2007). • 4. Counsel shall not express their personal opinion or beliefs regarding any aspect of the evidence or testimony,1 or personally bolster or vouch for the credibility of any witness or party in this cause. Mayo v. Gazarosian, 727 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Lewis, 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Cohen v. Pollack, 674 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.4(e). 5. Counsel shall refrain from expressing personal knowledge of facts in issue or personal opinion as to the justness of the cause, the credibility of a witness or the culpability of a civil litigant. Muhammad v. Toys “R” Us , 668 So. 2d 254 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Miami Coin-O-Wash v. McGough, 195 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). 6. Counsel shall not denigrate or impugn the integrity of opposing counsel. Examples of this are accusing counsel of “trickery”, “hiding the ball”, filing a frivolous law suit, fabricating evidence, using “smoke and mirrors”, or creating a “work of fiction”. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Crane, 683 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Morse, 653 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). 7. Counsel shall avoid using derogatory terms when referring to the opposing party, a witness, or opposing counsel and shall not make any disparaging comments about counsel’s occupation or performance in court. All-Site Corp. v. Delia Croce , 647 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Bellsouth v. Colatarci, 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1994). 8. Counsel shall not denigrate or impugn the integrity of another party or a witness. Examples of this are referring to an expert as “the best money could buy”, a “hired gun”, having a “special relationship” with counsel, giving “magic testimony”, using “smoke and mirrors”, throwing “pixie dust”, referring to a party as having “lawsuit pain”. King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Venning v. Roe, 616 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); 1 Phrases such as “I think”, “I believe” or “I submit” are generic figures of speech which, standing alone, are not improper and generally may be used in the course of closing argument. Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); Lowder v. Economic Opportunity Family Health Center, Inc., 680 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Forman v. Walshein, 671 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). • 9. Counsel shall not argue at a party or witness fabricated evidence or h as lied, absent record evidence to support such an argument. Counsel is strongly cautioned in this regard and should seek guidance from the Court before making any such argument to the jury. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Crane, supra; Forman v. Wallshein, 671 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). If counsel believes that the record supports the argument that the witness lied on the witness stand, then counsel shall demonstrate the same at sidebar prior to making the argument. • 10. If there is record evidence to support the argument that a witness lied in testimony, such argument shall be restricted to characterizing the witness’ testimony and counsel shall not engage in character assassination nor argue or imply that the witness is a chronic, habitual or pathological liar. Forman v. Wallshein, supra. • 17. Counsel’s arguments and comparisons should have some logical nexus in deduction or analogy to the evidence and facts in the instant case. Wright & Ford Millworks v. Long , 412 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1982) (i.e. no references to famous people or well-known verdicts). • 18. Counsel shall not attempt to argue facts not in evidence or imply that counsel is aware of the existence of evidence or testimony not introduced at trial. Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999); Carroll v. Dodsworth, 565 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Rosania, supra; Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.4(e). • 19. Counsel shall avoid making arguments that are not based on facts in evidence or reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Baptist Hospital v. Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Cardona v. Gutierrez, 562 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). • 20. Counsel shall not argue what other lawyers, parties, witnesses or juries have done in other cases, if such evidence has not been properly introduced at trial. Baptist Hospital Inc. v. Rawson, 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Martino v. Metropolitan Dade County, 655 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Walt Disney World v. Blaylock , supra; Silva v. Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). • 2 There may be rare instances in which such evidence might be admissible at trial. See, e.g. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 943 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (distinguishing between joint tortfeasors and subsequent tortfeasors). If such evidence is properly before the jury, it may of course be argued in closing argument to the extent it is relevant. 3 The Court recognizes that, under limited circumstances, such an argument might be relevant and proper. See e.g., Wransky v. Dalfo, 801 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (claim for punitive damages). • 25. Counsel shall not urge the jury to draw an adverse inference from the failure of the opposing party to call a non-party witness unless the proper showing has first been made with the court. Lowder v. Economic Opportunity Family Health Center , 680 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Cf. FP&L v. Goldberg, 856 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (applying different rule regarding the failure to call a party as a witness); Fino v. Nodine, 646 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (same). 26. Counsel shall not comment upon the presence or absence of insurance coverage, or comment on whether a party would or would not be responsible for paying any amount awarded. Nicaise v. Gagnon, 597 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1992); Ballard v. American Land Cruisers, Inc., supra; Skislak v. Wilson, 472 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). 27. Counsel shall not ask jurors to place themselves in the shoes of a party or ask jurors to view evidence from a party’s perspective, especially on the issue of financial responsibility or in determining the amount of damages which ought to be awarded. Metropolitan Dade County v. Zapata, 601 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Coral Gables Hospital Inc. v. Zabala, 520 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). 28. Counsel shall avoid making arguments that place the jury or ask the jury to place itself in the place of the plaintiff or defendant. Goutis v. Express Transport, Inc. , 699 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1997); Metropolitan Dade County v. Zapata, 601 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); See also, Simmonds v. Lowery , 563 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1990) (“a golden rule argument suggests to jurors that they put themselves in the shoes of one of the parties, and is impermissible because it encourages the jurors to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.”). 29. Counsel shall not make any arguments that misstate the law or that mislead the jury. City Provisioners, Inc. v. Anderson, 578 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1991); Craft v. Kramer, 571 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
1. Counsel is reminded that the purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues in a case by “applying the evidence to the law applicable to the case.” Mayo v. Gazarosian, 727 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5 th DCA 1999); Airport Rent -A-Car, Inc. v. Lewis, 701 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Cohen v. Pollack, 674 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4- 3.4(e). Hill v. State , 515 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla. 1987). See also, McGee v. State, 83 So.3d 837 (Fla. 4 D 2011) (quoting, Fleurimond v. State, 10 So.3d 1140, 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)) (“The purpose of closing argument is to present a review of the evidence and suggestions for drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence.”); Gonzalez v. State 990 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 2008) (“The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn
Reviewer note: Document sha256: 709617e00814e95fca9a025f8bb8976bba800e58c01f3e7f63c9361e8de2c1da. One rule per order rather than per topic, so an order's requirements stay together. Published during the completeness pass. | Title normalised 2026-07-26 for readability; the court's own asset name was "19th Cir. — judge-lillian-ewen__Standing-Order-on-Civil-Closing-Argument.pdf: published requirements". Only the display title changed — the requirement text, source URL and hash are untouched. Text layer cleaned 2026-09-08 (Phase 3e): running page headers/footers removed; wording untouched. Text layer cleaned 2026-09-08 (Phase 3g): 11 kerning-split words rejoined; wording untouched. Verbatim from the order, captured 2026-07-24; whitespace normalised only. No OCR was used anywhere in this chain. [moved from the text 2026-09-14]
1 verbatim requirement on exhibits in BETSY BENSON's division.
4 verbatim requirements on exhibits & evidence.
1 verbatim requirement on exhibits & evidence.